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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respndent,

-vAALPH WYNFIELD FORSHEE,

CASE NO. 16350

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of the defendentappellant, Ralph Wynfield Forshee, for the crime of Unlawful
Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Marijuana,
a Third Degree Felony, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1953) as charged
in an Information filed in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake Couty, State of Utah, the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, Judge presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellent was tried by jury before the Honorable
Judge James S. Sawaya and found guilty of Unlawful Distribution
for Value of a Controlled
~the

Substance, to wit:

Information on July, 17, 1978.

Marijuana, as charged

Appellant was sentenced

to The Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of 0-5 years

as provided by law.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

I:efendant-Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction and

a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FAcrS
The testirrony in this case

in

reference to a single alleged

oc=rence concerning the sale of marijuana by the Appellant to Deputy
Sheriff Mark Whittaker was at extrerre variance.

As to this alleged

occurrence, the prosecution produced the testirrony of only one witness,
Deputy Whittaker.

The defense offe=ed the testirrony of three witnesses,

all of whom denied that the alleged event oc=red.

'Ihese witnesses were

the Appellant, Vickie Forshee and Val Densley.

a.

According to the testirrony of Deputy l'lhittaker:

Officer vlhittaker had been employed only a short tirre at the

Salt lake County Sheriff's Office prior to the alleged sale of marijuana by
Appellant.

(Tr. 12).

Officer Whittaker began w::Jrking at the County Sheriff's

Office in January of 1978.

(Tr. 24) •

He did not begin w::Jrking as an under-

cover officer until three rronths later.

(Tr. 12).

Deputy Whittaker testified

his duty was to rreet with infonnants who were originally introduced to him
by other officers.

Those infonnants would introduce the undercover officer

to people allegedly "dealing narcotics".

(Tr. 12).

w11ittaker called an infonnant on April 21, 1978.

Whittaker

stated the infonnant had a=anged previous sales for him, but those arrangerrents had always fallen through.

(Tr. 27).

the I:elton Bowling lanes in Granger

tw::J

Whittaker rret the infonrant at

hours after the phone conversation,

at approximately 5:30 p.m. in order to meet sareone to purchase "narcotics'··
(Tr. 13).

The infonnant and Whittaker traveled to a new location "just north

of 3100 South 3450 West".

(Tr. 14).

At this destination, Whittaker entered

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a residence wherein he net a man he identified at the trial as the Appellant
(Tr. 14)

Whittaker testified bt.D "little girls" were present along with

the defendant's forrrer wife, Vickie Forshee

present was the informant.

The only other person

The informant had previously given Officer

1-hlttaker Vickie Forshee's narre (Tr. 15) and had told Officer Whittaker
that he lived with Vickie For.shee

at this residence.

After Officer Whittaker entered the residence, Vickie Forshee
[Xlinted to a srrall plastic bag on the kitchen table. (Tr. 16)

Whittaker

sat at the kitchen table while the others renained in the living room.
(Tr. 35)

No one else left or entered the roans. (Tr. 17)

"rrentioned it seerred to be kind of a srrall lJag. "

Whittaker

According to Whittaker

the Appellant replied it was "as good as tiestick" (Tr. 16) •
Officer Whittaker gave the Appellant $50.00 for the bag of
rrarijuana and the Appellant placed the m:mey in his wallet. (Tr. 17)
Whittaker kept the marijuana in his possession tmtil giving it to Deputy
Sheriff Randall Anderson_one hour later at Valley Fair Mall. (Tr. 19)
The informant did not leave tl1e residence when Whittaker left because

he lived there.

(Tr. 18)

Whittaker stated he returned twice to this

residence after April 21st.
later. (Tr. 28,29)

The first tine was approxilrately bt.D days

He talked to Vickie Forshee

to locate the Appellant.

both tines attempting

The informant was no longer living at Vickie

Forshee's residence the second tine vlhittaker returned. (Tr. 29)
Whittaker testified he had not known the informant was
a convicted felon, but he had been aware tllat the informant "had been

in and out of jails." (Tr. 36)
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The testinony of Officer Whittaker was admittedly based on

a typewritten rep::>rt of the alleged April 21st occurrence as well as
his rrerrory. (Tr. 2 3)
Whittaker's notes

The typewritten rep::>rt was taken fran Officer

~ritten

after he left Vickie Forshee's residence and

prior to his rreeting Deputy Sheriff Anderson. (Tr. 22)

The rep::>rt was

typed that night, April 21st, at approxlirately 10:00 p.m. (Tr. 38)
Whittaker did not examine the rep::>rt after being typed until August 22nd,
the date of the preliminary hearing. (Tr. 23)
b. Testinony of the Appellant Vickie Forshee and Val Densley:

The llppellant and Val Densley testified that they had never
seen Officer Whittaker prior to the preliminary hearing in August.
Vickie Forshee

(Tr. 54, 721. ,

testified she saw Whittaker for the first time at the

pretrial conference, because she did not attend the preliminary hearing.
(Tr. 64)

The defendant did not have any specific recollection of April

21, 1978. (Tr. 58)

The l\ppellant testified he has tw:l children, one roy

and one girl, both from his forrrer wife, Vickie Forshee. (Tr. 61)

He

admitted to having been convicted on a previous marijuana charge "over
three years ago." (Tr. 61)
Vickie Forshee testified she lived at 3488 BB West Lake Road
w-ith her children from January 1 until the first of June. (Tr. 62)

She

rret Richard Garrett one week before Christmas of the previous year. ('I'r. 631
Richard Garrett lived with her from the first of January until the first
or middle of April 1978, when he severely beat her and she requested
he leave. (Tr. 63, 64)
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The Appellant, Vickie Forshee

and Val I:ensley testified to

tbe intense jealousy and hatred felt by Richard Garrett for the Appellant.

secause of this jealousy, the Jlppellant brought Val Densley, his girlfriend,

..

with him to his forrrer wife's residence when he visited his children. (Tr. 54,65,71)
(llly once did the Appellant not bring Val Densley with him to Vickie

Forshee' s

residence when he w=nt to visit his children.
Richard Garrett threatened to kill the Appellant in approx:irrately

April of 197 8 . (Tr. 54 , 55, 7 3)

He atterrpted to go to the defendant's

residence taking a 30. 06 rifle but was arrested by the Kearns police after
Vickie Forshee informed them of Garrett's intent. (Tr. 63, 64)

A police

rep:lrt of this atterrpt was filed.

Vickie Forshee testified she had known that Garrett had been
ill prison until September 1977. (Tr. 66)
'

y~

He was arrested the following

while he lived with Vickie Forshee during the oammission of a burglary,

(Tr. 55, 67)

Vickie Forshee did not know if Richard Garrett was an

illforrrant for the police. (Tr. 64)
for the burglary.

Richard Garrett was released on bond

Vickie Forshee stated, "He w=nt and pulled another robbery,

stoled a car and split.

They caught him in california and he's in prison

in California right now. •· (Tr. 67)
Counsel for Appellant was thwarted

in efforts to determine if the

alleged confidential infonnant and Richard Garrett were one and the sane.

Counsel for Appellant repeatedly atterrpted to discover the identity
of the confidential infonnant who supposedly "set up" the drug transaction
and who was present for the alleged consumation of this transaction.

A

~omal ''discovery" request was made in the form of a "M::ltion for A Bill of

Particulars" .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the M::>tion it was requested:
1. Provide the narres of all persons present at the time of
the alleged sale of a controlled substance •• , , . , ,
The State of utah

ap~red

this request without disclosing the narre of

the said infoJ:IPaiJ.t as follows :
1. Present at the time of the alleged sale of a controlled
substance were, Deputy Mark Wittaker Salt lake COunty Sheriff's
Office, Vicki Forshee, the defendant Ralph Wynfield Forshee,
and a confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t wrose identity will not be disclosed. The confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t is not disclosed for the
reason that he is still being utilized by other police agencies
in undercover narcotics v.ork and to disclose his identity v.ould
corrpranise and prejudice those investigations. Furthe:rnore,
the entire transaction took place between Deputy Whittaker and
the Forshee's and the confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t was not involved
in the transaction other than the fact that he was present.
(Emphasis Supplied)
Appellant also requested:
4 . Provide the number of other arrests and alleged unlawful
sales that the undercover officer entered into during the rronth
of the alleged distribution by the above narred defendant.
Responclmt through counsel answered:
4. Question number four relates to information involving a
confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t, which information is not furnished as
stated in question no. one.
Appellant then filed a rrotion to dismiss the prosecution for
failure to disclose the narre

of the alleged confidential infoJ:IPaiJ.t,

infonning the court that the infoJ:IPaiJ.t was believed to be Appellant's
antagonist Richard A. Garrett.

This rrotion was denied and all efforts of

Appellant to secure the disclosure of the identity of the infonrer were
denied by the court. (Tr.atl2-5)
On the 11th day of January, 1979 Jlppellant filed a "Notice of

Intent'' to use the defense of entraJ=ID2!1t.

-6-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE FAIWRE OF THE STATE TO DISCLOSE THE NAME AND WHEREABOUTS
OF THE 50-CALLED CDNFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WAS CONSTI'IUTIONALLY

IMPERMISSABLE

AND NOI' IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 36 , UTAH RULES

OF EVIDENCE.

In the case at bar, Appellant requested the disclosure of the
name and whereabouts of the so-called confidential informant who was
present during the alleged transaction which lead to the charge in this
case.

Counsel for the State objected to such disclosure claiming a

privilege against the disclosure of such info:rmation.

Appellant sul::mi.ts

that under both the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 36 and by Constitutional

dictate, Roviaro V. United States, 335 U.S. 53 (1957) that the State ITR.ISt
disclose the info:rmation sought or dismiss the Info:rmation against Appellant.
In Roviaro, as in the instant case, the accused was charged with illegal

drug trafficking.

Roviaro was specifically charged with Distribution

of

ll2roin for Value and Importation of Heroin in a two count indictrrent (353
U.S. 565).

As in the instant case through both pretrial discovery ITOtions

and at trial defense counsel sought the narre and whereabouts of the govern-

rrent informer who was present for the "sales" transaction which formed the
basis of the Indictment.
disclosure.

The Court denied all such defense efforts for

The United States Suprerre Court in reversing the defendant's

conviction on both counts on Due Process grounds, held that since the

informant

was an active participant in the transactions and his testiiiDny might be

relevant and helpful to the accused' s defense, then the prosecution was
'Jilder a duty to disclose the narre and whereabouts of the inforrnant or
Glsmiss the case against Roviaro.

(353 U.S. at 62).
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The Roviaro decision and the various State statutes and rules

which embody the so-called infonrer privilege rrerely clarify and raise to
the level of ronstitutional significance what was the Ccrmon Law Rule.

1

The Court in Roviaro held that the Governrrent is privileged to withhold

fran disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations
of law to officers charged with enforcerrent of that law.

The Court stated

that the purpose of this Governrrental privilege is the furtherance and
protection of the obligation of citizens to c:arrnunicate their knowledge
of the cammission of crirres to law enforcerrent officers and by preserving
2
their anonymity, encourage them to perform that obligation.
The Court

~t

on to hold that this policy concern must of

necessity yield on certain occasions and engrafted certain specific limitations on the scope of that privilege.
The Roviaro rule and its exceptions has subsequently becane
enacted in Utah and other jurisdictions as a Rule of Evidentiary Privilege.
see Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 36 (Enacted 1971) which provides in its
entirety:
Rule 36 .

Identity of Informer

"A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of
a person whc has furnished information purporting to disclose a violation
of a provision of the laws of this State or of the United States to a

L. See Underhill, On Criminal Evidence, (3d ed. 1898) §287 at 395-396;
54 Gal. Jur. 2d, Witnessess, §45 at 305 and People v. Garcia, 67 Gal.
2d 830, 64 cal. Rptr. 110, 434 P.2d 366 (1967) and Honore v. Superior Court
70 cal. 2d 162, 74 cal. Rptr. 233, 449 P.2d 169 (1969) (Which speaks in
terms of Federal and State Due Process violations. )
2. McCormick, On Evidence (12th Cleary Ed. 1972) §lll at 236 Roviaro,~._
United States, 353 U.S. at 59.
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representative of the State or the United States or governrrental divison
thereof, charged with the duty of enforcing that provision, and evidence
thereof is inadmissible, unless the judge finds that (a) the identity of

the person furnishing the infonnation has already been otherwise disclosed

or (b) disclosure of his identity is essential to assure a fair determination of the issues."

3

The exceptions to the confidentiality requirement and which
'

ll!lder the utah rule and Roviaro' s dictates require disclosure are as

follows:
(a) The privilege does not extend to the disclosure of the
contents of a camn.mica~on which will not tend to reveal the
identity of an infomer;
(b) The privilege is not ap~licable where the identity of the
infomer has been disclosed;
(c) Where the disclosure of an infomer's identity is relevant
and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to
a fair determination of the crime.6
~Vhere
c~l

any of the above situations exist, the trial court should

disclosure and, if the Governrrent withholds the infonnation per-

taining to the identity of the infonnant, the case should be dismissed.

7

In the instant case, both the second and third lirni tations are

applicable.

The Utah Rule is based upon and identical to Unifonn Rule of Evidence,
See also Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 510 (P.O.D. 1971) (a
siJ11ilar Rule was not enacted as part of the new Federal Rules of Evidence)
~also Section 78-24-8 (5), U.C.A. (1953) and III, Whartons Criminal Evidence
ll3th Torcia Ed. 1973) §580 at 116-117.
3.

Rule 36.

I

Roviaro, 353 u.s. at 60 fn. 7; VIII vligrrore Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §2374
Ill ;~ck, en Evri..dence (Cleary Ed. 1972) §lll at 238 fn. 50.

4.

I.

Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61 fn. 8; VIII vligrrore Evidence (3d ed. 1940)

§237~

Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 61 fn. 9; McConnick,
mi~ fn.JSl.

6.

en Evidence (Cleary Ed. 1972)
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a.

THE DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMANT WAS NECESSARY TO THE DEFENSE.

The informant not only supposedly set the "deal up" but also was

an eyewitness to the event and within earshot of the alleged conversation.
In dealing with this type of case, the COurt in Roviaro, said:

We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure
is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing
the public interest in protecting the flo.v of infonnation against
the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper
balance renders non-:disclosure e=neous must depend on the
particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration
the cr:irre charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors.
(353 u.s. at 62).

'lhe Goverrurent in Roviaro, ho.vever, conceded

the necessity of

disclosure as to the heroin sales count, which is identical to the instant
8
case.
And, the courts have uniformly held that disclosure is :rrandatory
in such situations, as in the case at bar,

wherein the informant is an
9
active and actual participant or eyewitness to the alleged offense.
A
recent case on point is People v. Goliday, 106 cal. Rptr. 113, 505 p.2d
537 (1973) wherein the california Supreme COurt in following Roviaro held
that failure to disclose the narre and whereabouts of a percipient eyewitness
(confidential informant) to the defense or make a reasonably diligent effort
to find the witness denied the defendant Due Process of Law and required
10
reversal of a heroin sale conviction.

8.

Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 58-59.

9. For an extensive collection of cases so holding, see III vJharton' s
Criminal Evidence (13th Torcia Ed. 1973) §580 at 119 fn. 67.1.
10. The courts extend the obligation of the prosecution to include disclosure as well as . . . . "reasonable steps to locate or obtain information
about such eyewitness informants. " Eleazer v. Superior COurt, l cal. 3d
847, 83 cal. Rptr. 586, 464 P.2d 42, 54 (1970). People v. Goliday, supra,
505 P.2d at 542-543.
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As the Suprerre Court stated in Roviaro:

A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege
arises fran the fundarrental requirerrents of fairness. Where
the disclosure of an inforrrer' s identity, or of the contents of
his ccmnunication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair detennination of a cause, the
privilege must give way. In these situations, the trial court
may require disclosure and, if the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action • . . (353 U.S. at 60-61).11
A well reasoned opinion as to the requirerrent of producing the

identity of the informant appears in the case of M:lendez v. Superintendent,
Clinton Correct. Fac., 399 F. Supp. 430, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), wherein the

court held that to allo.v the Governrrent to conceal the identity of potential
witnesses is in derogation of l:oth defendant's right to carpulsory process
under the Sixth Amendrrent and the right to be furnished exculpatory evidence
12
under the Fifth Amendrrent.
The court stated:
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. (1967) found that right so
fundarrental that it was applicable to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendrrent, and required the invalidation of a state
statute, rooted in the ccmron law, providing that persons charged
as co-participants in the sarre crirre could not testify for one
another. As the court there put it:
"The right to offer the testirrony of witnesses, and
to carpel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain
terms the right to present a defense, the right to present
the defendant ' s version of the facts as well as the
prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth
lies." (338 U.S. at 19).

ll. The court in Roviaro indicated that in circumstances such as those in
the instant case and Roviaro the defense need only indicate that the inforrrer's
testirrony might assist the defendant in presenting his case. (353 U.S. at 64);
See also MCCOrmick, §lll at 238 fn. 51. Also see the california Suprerre
Court's staterrent in People v. Goliday, supra, 505 P.2d at 543 (collecting
cases) " . . . an accused need show only a possibility that a material witness
might testify favorably on his behalf. "

Accord. United States v. Edwards, 503 F.2d 838, 840-41 (9th Cir, 1974);
v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1439 (19th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Jones, 492 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1974); M:lawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1
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Disclosure of the infomant na.y have assisted in AppellantS
defense of Entraj:m8Ilt originally offe=ed in the fonn of a notice of intent

to rely on that defense.
M::>re importantly, ha-rever, there was a severe conflict in the
testinony of the alleged percipient witnesses to this supposed drug transaction.

Three witnesses called by Appellant, including Appellant himself,

testified that the transaction alleged just did not

==.

Whittaker testified that he purchased drugs fran Appellant.

Only Deputy
The Deputy's

credibility was genuinely affected by his inability to rerrerrber certain
surrounding events.

For exarrple, the number and gender of Appellants

children allegedly present during the transaction.
b.

THERE IS NO PRIVILEX:iE WHEN THE NAME OF THE INFORMANT IS KNCWN
AND UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES DISCIDSURE IS REQUIRED.

In the case at bar, disclosure was also na.ndated under the

second prong of the Roviaro rule, ie.
has been disclosed or is known.

where the identity of the inforrrer

13

In the instant case, Appellant felt his antagonist Richard Garrett

was the infomant.

If in fact Garrett was the infomant, there was no

confidentiality.remaining and disclosure should have been made when requested.
Appellant did not request disclosure solely for disclosure~ sake.
In the instant case where the credibility and recollection of the

alleged

undercover purchase was called into severe question, then the identity and
recollection of the eyewitness infomant was manifest to insure the truth
finding process was not abridged by faulty recollection and half-truths.

13.

Accord. Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 36 (b)
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Moreover, in order to insure effective cross-examination of
J);puty Wllttaker the narre and wherearouts of the

informan~rirre

!lOVer in

the transaction was necessitated.
The trial court allo.ved Appellant to elicit a

~alth

of testi-

rrony concerning Richard Garrett and his a.nirrosity towards Appellant.

The

forced disclosure of the narre of Garrett as the informant would have allowed
the jury to determine i f in fact the case was a "set up".
of witnesses was the primary issue

When the credibility

at the trial belav and disclosure of

the ubrost necessity in allaving Appellant to effectively present his theory

of the case .

By holding back the names of the informant the defense was

unable to effectively investigate and prepare for the cross-examination of
~puty

Whittaker.

This prevents the defense fran truely testing the credibility

and veracity of those who attack the defense case.

SUch preparation has

long been recognized as rreans of effectively discrediting testillony upon

which a reasonable doubt might reasonably rest. 14

Experience teaches that

effective confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses may push a case

~yond

the line where a reasonable doubt exists.

15

14.

See Wellman, The Art of Cross-Examination (1905). In fact without
preparation cross-examination can be a dangerous ~apon which may
"backfire on its user." I I Schwartz, Proof, Persuasion and Cross-Examination
11975) Ch. 16. Jeans, Trial Advocacy (1975) Ch. 13. and Palrrer, Courtroan
Strategies (1959) Ch. 5 at 90-91 (Cross-Examination " . . . . is a t\oKJ edged
SWOrd that may cut both ways . . . Or as Hamlet would say, you may be hoist
with your avn petard: Cross-Examination may explode in your own face . . • )
ad~te

15. Hence the courts are generally loath to restrict cross-examination by a
defendant in a criminal case. Deinhardt v. State, Md., 348 A.2d 286 (1975);
S~te v. Mason, Utah, 530 P.2d 795 (1975); State v. Warner, 79 U. 510, 12 P. 2d
ll7 (1932); State v. Smith, 90 U. 2d 482, 62 P.2d lllO (1936); State v._ Srrelser
234 2d 246, 463 P.2d 562, 564 (1970); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Giles
~Mllyland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967) and Gigilio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
11973)
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CONCLUSION

In =nclusion, the case law is clear that fl.ll1darrental fairness
eml:x:xlied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 1\nendnent to the
United States Constitution and Article cne, Section

7 of the constitution

of the State of utah, and the letter of utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 36
demand disclosure of the narre and whereal:x>uts of the alleged ccnfidential
infonrant in circumstances such as the instant case or dismissal of the
Infonmtion.
Article One, Section 12 of the COnstitution of the State of
utah as well as the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendrrents to the constitution
of the United States required effective cross-examination and ccnfrontation
of all witnesses against the accused and carpulsory process to se=e
attendance of p::>tentially helpful witnesses.

Both of these crucial con-

stitutional rights v.ere abridged by allCMing the State of utah to hide rehind
a false mask of =nfidentiality in the instant case.
Wherefore, Appellant respectfully requests reversal of his ccnviction and the judgerrent and sentence entered thereon and remand

of

case for new trial.

Ronald J. Yengich
Attorney for Appellant
O'COnnell and Yengich
Attorneys a_t Law
44 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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~

MAILING CERI'IFICATE

I

hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the fore-

going Brief of Appellant to the office of the Attorney General,
I

236 state Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

~

day of December, 1979.
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